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Abstract We investigated the effects of privatization on
hospital efficiency in Germany. To do so, we obtained boot-
strapped data envelopment analysis (DEA) efficiency scores
in the first stage of our analysis and subsequently employed
a difference-in-difference matching approach within a panel
regression framework. Our findings show that conversions
from public to private for-profit status were associated with
an increase in efficiency of between 2.9 and 4.9%. We
defined four alternative post-privatization periods and found
that the increase in efficiency after a conversion to private
for-profit status appeared to be permanent. We also observed
an increase in efficiency for the first three years after hos-
pitals were converted to private non-profit status, but our
estimations suggest that this effect was rather transitory. Our
findings also show that the efficiency gains after a conver-
sion to private for-profit status were achieved through sub-
stantial decreases in staffing ratios in all analyzed staff
categories with the exception of physicians and administra-
tive staff. It was also striking that the efficiency gains of
hospitals converted to for-profit status were significantly
lower in the diagnosis-related groups (DRG) era than in
the pre-DRG era. Altogether, our results suggest that con-
verting hospitals to private for-profit status may be an ef-
fective way to ensure the scarce resources in the hospital
sector are used more efficiently.
Keywords Hospitals . Privatization . Performance
measurement . Data envelopment analysis . Propensity score
matching . Germany
1 Introduction
Rising health expenditure and tight public budgets over the
past four decades have led decision makers in many Western
industrialized countries to seek ways to improve the perfor-
mance of health care organizations. Hospitals, in particular,
are increasingly being held accountable for their efficiency
and financial performance. Having identified inefficiencies
and financial risks in public hospitals, national and local
governments in a wide range of countries have responded by
privatizing these institutions. The chief motivation behind
the privatizations that have taken place in these countries
during the past twenty years has been the expectation that
shifting from public to private ownership would lead to
gains in organizational performance, especially in terms of
efficiency. Considering the importance of this topic, not least
in the political debate, the lack of quantitative empirical
studies on the effects of hospital privatization is surprising
[1, 2].
The present investigation is the first to examine the
effects of privatization on technical efficiency in the hospital
market. To do so, we examined a large sample of German
hospitals that changed from public to either private non-
profit or to private for-profit status. Following an extensive
wave of privatizations that began in the mid-1990s, the large
hospital market in Germany is now fertile ground for inves-
tigating these effects. In Germany, three different types of
hospital ownership have co-existed for decades: private for-
profit, private non-profit, and public. As their classification
implies, both types of private hospitals are owned by private
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entities, whereas public hospitals are owned mainly by
public entities, such as local or regional governments. Be-
tween 1995 and 2008, a substantial number of local and
regional governments in Germany sold their hospitals to
private for-profit and private non-profit owners. The total
number of private for-profit hospitals increased by 164, or
44%, which represented a rise in market share from 6 to
18% measured in terms of hospital beds. During the same
period, the market share of private non-profit hospitals
decreased slightly, from 38 to 36%, because some private
non-profit hospitals were also converted to private for-profit
ownership [3, 4].
In the present study, we focused on technical efficiency to
assess changes in hospital performance following privatiza-
tion. After using a bootstrapped data envelopment analysis
technique to estimate efficiency scores for each hospital in
our sample [5, 6], we employed propensity score matching
to ensure that the two groups of hospitals in our analysis (i.e.
privatized and non-privatized) were comparable in terms of
organizational characteristics, environmental characteristics,
and patient heterogeneity [7–9]. Subsequently, following an
approach suggested by Simar and Wilson [10], we estimated
a second-step regression model for truncated longitudinal
data, with bootstrapped DEA efficiency scores as dependent
variable. Finally, while controlling for the impact of hospital
organizational and environmental characteristics, we applied
a difference-in-difference specification of the regression
model to examine whether privatization improved hospital
efficiency.
Section 2 of this paper reviews the relevant theoretical
and empirical literature on privatization and its impact on
hospital performance. Section 3 presents the setting, data,
and methodology used to explore this relationship. Section 4
describes and discusses the results of our analysis, and the
fifth, and final, section 5 draws conclusions and suggests
topics for future research.
2 Previous literature on privatization
Theoretical predictions regarding the performance effects of
hospital privatization can be made based on a large body of
literature investigating the various effects of different own-
ership types. There are three fundamental theories that can
be drawn upon when comparing public and private hospi-
tals, each of which provides different explanations of a
common outcome. According to agency theory and
property-rights theory, as well as public choice theory, the
rationale for privatization is that the resulting changes in an
hospital’s objectives, incentives, and control mechanisms
lead to improved performance: Public hospitals acquired
by a private for-profit organization are expected to maxi-
mize profit through a high degree of technical efficiency,
producing services in such a way that marginal cost will
equal marginal revenue. In turn, public hospitals acquired
by a private non-profit organization are expected to improve
technical efficiency by suppressing politically motivated
resource allocation and expanding their output at least to
the point where total cost equals total revenue [11–18].
Generally speaking, there have been—from an empirical
point of view—two categories of studies that deal with
ownership and privatization. The first, and by far the most
numerous, of these have compared the performance of pub-
lic and private entities in industries in which both types of
ownership coexist [19]. In a meta-review of studies of this
nature that focused on the hospital market, Shen et al. [20]
concluded that there was little evidence supporting the stan-
dard assumption that private for-profit hospitals outperform
hospitals with other types of ownership. Herr [21] and
Tiemann and Schreyögg [22] found that public hospitals
outperform hospitals with other types of ownership in the
German hospital market. Because none of these studies
investigated changes in ownership type during a specified
period—and thus did not examine the effects of privatizing
public entities—they will not be discussed in any further
detail below.
The second category of studies has focused on privatiza-
tion and its impact on organizational performance, usually
employing a longitudinal design. From a methodological
perspective, these studies have taken two different
approaches. The first was introduced by Megginson et al.
[23], who compared the means and medians of the periods
before and after privatization according to defined perfor-
mance criteria. Few of the studies that have taken this
approach, however, have included control groups consisting
of non-privatized state-owned organizations. The second
approach has involved much larger samples of privatized
entities and, defining the privatization event as an interven-
tion, has applied methods proposed in the literature on
program evaluation [24, 25]. The majority of these studies
have used some kind of difference-in-difference method to
analyze the effects of privatization on performance com-
pared to the performance of a control group of non-
privatized entities, controlling for time-invariant differences
between the groups. As part of our literature review, we
were able to identify ten studies from different industries
that used such a method to evaluate privatization effects,
including four studies on hospitals: Picone et al. [26], Shen
[27], Shen [28] and Farsi [29], all of whom examined
ownership conversion effects in the US hospital market.
Three of these four studies assessed the quality of care
after a change in ownership and found that conversions from
private non-profit to private for-profit status had a signifi-
cantly negative impact [26, 27, 29]. One study [29] found
that a change from private for-profit to private non-profit
status also had a negative effect on the quality of care. Thus,
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the negative effect of conversions in both directions may
suggest that conversion activity by itself may lead to dis-
rupted organizational routines (e.g., in surgeries) or other
organizational problems due to the restructuring process that
end up in lower quality of care. Based on this negative effect
on the quality of care following conversion activity it seems
crucial to control for the quality of care when examining
efficiency gains after hospital conversion.
Using profit margins, capacity, staffing ratios, salaries,
patient mix, and the amount of unprofitable care as meas-
ures, Shen [28] and Picone et al. [26] examined the impact
of changes in ownership on hospital performance. Both
studies found that hospitals converted from public or private
non-profit status to private for-profit status increased their
profit margins and reduced staffing ratios. In addition, Shen
[28] found that these hospitals reduced cost and increased
revenue. She also found that a change from public or private
for-profit status to private non-profit status resulted in slight
reductions in cost and in nursing staff, but did not lead to
increased profit margins.
Although all four studies were pioneering in their
approach and focus, they have several important weak-
nesses. First, Shen [28] and Picone et al. [26] used
profit margins as a measure of performance. There is
evidence, however, that public hospitals are averse to
seeking profit maximization [30]. As a result, it seems
reasonable to assume that using financial performance
criteria, such as profit margins, may lead to bias in pre-
post comparisons of privatized entities and control
group designs. For this reason, we believe that produc-
tivity, in terms of technical efficiency, is a more suitable
measure of changes in performance among hospitals that
have undergone a conversion in ownership type. Sec-
ond, none of the four studies specifically examined the
phenomenon of privatization, which would have re-
quired a focus solely on changes from public status to
private non-profit or private for-profit status. Instead,
they examined the effects of conversion from any form
of ownership to public, private non-profit, or private
for-profit status. Third, Shen [27, 28] was the only
author to address the problem of causal interference,
using a difference-in-difference method combined with
a matching approach to investigate the impact of privat-
ization. Finally, all four studies implicitly assumed that
changes in performance are attributable primarily to
changes in ownership status. There may, however, be
other changes to the market environment, such as the
introduction of DRGs, that also interact with the privat-
ization event. By focusing on the impact of privatization
on technical efficiency and employing a difference-in-
difference matching approach, we attempt to address
these shortcomings and contribute to the current under-
standing of the consequences of hospital privatization.
3 Estimation strategy and data
3.1 Data envelopment analysis
In studies on the hospital sector, DEA is the most frequently
used approach to measuring efficiency [31, 32]. It is a non-
parametric frontier method which uses linear programming
to evaluate the relative technical efficiency of an individual
hospital based on observed data. Essentially, DEA compares
an individual hospital’s observed level of outputs and inputs
with the best practice production frontier. This frontier was
derived by those hospitals that could maximize output given
inputs (output-oriented model) or minimize inputs given
output (input-oriented model). DEA applies linear program-
ming to construct a piece-wise linear-segmented efficiency
frontier based on observed best practice (for a detailed
description of the transformation into a linear programming
model, see Charnes et al. [33], Banker et al. [34] and Ozcan
[35]).
DEA allows multiple inputs and outputs to be considered
simultaneously, which seems particularly well-suited to
measuring the efficiency of complex service organizations
like hospitals. In contrast to parametric methods such as
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), DEA has the advantage
of not requiring that any assumptions be made about the
functional form of the production or cost frontier. This
reduces the need for a theoretical exposition of the model.
SFA is also frequently used to measure efficiency in health
care organizations. Because both techniques have their
strengths and weaknesses, Coelli et al. [36] propose evalu-
ating their suitability depending on the context of study. As
in other investigations that have measured hospital efficien-
cy, our decision to use DEA was driven by data availability
[37]: our data set contained a range of input and output
variables suitable for DEA, but did not contain input prices,
which are an important prerequisite for SFA.
Based on our understanding of the market constraints
within the German hospital sector, we assumed variable
returns to scale, which may be appropriate when it is im-
possible to assume that all observed units are operating at an
optimal scale [34]. In the health care sector, imperfect com-
petition and budgetary constraints, as well as regulatory
constraints on entry, mergers, and exits, can often cause
organizations to operate at an inefficient scale size [38]. In
light of this theoretical framework, we used the following
empirical model in our analysis. In the input-oriented case,
we estimated the variable returns to scale model by Banker,
Charnes, and Cooper (BCC) as a linear programming mod-
el, as follows [34]:
ϑi, i01,…,n is the hospital’s efficiency, where n repre-
sents the number of observations (i.e. the number of
hospitals).
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ϑi ¼ 1=θi, where θi is the inefficiency.
Matrix X 2 Rkn refers to k observed inputs of n com-
pared hospitals, and matrix Y 2 Rrn refers to r observed
outputs of the compared hospitals. Vectors xi 2 Rk and yi 2
R
r represent the inputs and outputs of unit i (i.e. the ith
columns of matrix X and Y, respectively). Furthermore, 1
refers to a column vector of ones with a suitable dimension.
The DEA efficiency score, which is the reciprocal of the
inefficiency θi, can be obtained by solving the following
BCC linear programming model [39]:
s:t:
θ ¼ Minθ;
Yl y0  0;
Xlþ θx0  0;
1Tl ¼ 1; l  0:
ð1Þ
Using DEA efficiency scores for a second-stage regres-
sion has been found to result in inconsistent estimates unless
these scores are corrected by a bootstrapping procedure.
According to Simar and Wilson [5, 6] the statistical proper-
ties of the estimated efficiency measures are essential for
their interpretations and here a serious problem arises in a
two-stage analysis (i.e. DEA followed by some form of
regression analysis) from the fact that DEA efficiency esti-
mates are serially correlated. The serial correlation occurs in
finite samples due to the fact that perturbations of observa-
tions lying on the estimate frontier will in many, and perhaps
all, cases cause changes in efficiencies estimated for other
observations. In the general multi-output multi-input DEA
framework, the bootstrapping procedure seems to offer the
only means of inferring the statistical properties of the
estimated DEA efficiency scores (i.e. to estimate the bias
and variance, and to construct confidence intervals). The
basic idea of the bootstrap method is to approximate the
sampling distributions of the DEA efficiency estimator by
using the empirical distribution of resampled estimates
obtained from a resampling simulation. The bootstrapping
procedure applied in the present study follows the approach
developed by Simar and Wilson [5, 6]. In our case, the bias-
corrected scores were derived from 500 bootstrap iterations,
which allowed us to improve the statistical efficiency in the
second-stage regression (see Section 3.3).
When selecting inputs and outputs for the first stage of our
analysis, we followed the example of other studies that have
developed DEA frameworks for measuring hospital efficiency
[35, 37, 38, 40]. For our purposes, we chose six inputs and two
outputs. The first input variable (SUPPLIES) represents the
amount spent on supplies per year, including operational
expenses, but excluding payroll, capital, and depreciation
expenses. Taking into account the relative importance of
resource use in terms of labor in the hospital production
process, we chose the number of full-time equivalents (FTEs)
for the following personnel categories as additional input
variables: physicians (PHYS), nursing staff (NURSE), other
clinical staff (CLIN), administrative staff (ADMIN), and other
nonclinical staff members (NONCLIN).
In our first DEA efficiency model, we used the number of
inpatient cases per year in each hospital as the only output
variable (INPATIENT). A second model specification
served as a sensitivity analysis to test whether the efficiency
scores and ranks remained stable when a measure of quality
of care was employed as a second output [41]. To do so, we
used the average in-hospital mortality rate per year for each
hospital to adjust for variations in the quality of care be-
tween hospitals. The second output thus represents the num-
ber 1 minus the average in-hospital mortality rate per year
(1-MORTALITY).
Using output variables like these can be problematic if
patient heterogeneity (i.e. case mix) varies systematically
across the hospitals in a sample. This is because hospitals
with a more complex case mix are likely to receive lower
efficiency scores. To address this potential shortcoming, we
used patient-level data to condense a comprehensive set of
comorbidities to a single numeric score that (a) summarized
disease burden and resource use and (b) was sufficiently
discriminative for predicting mortality. In order to generate
this case-mix index for each hospital, we relied on the
comorbidities included in the Elixhauser Comorbidity Index
[42]. The Elixhauser Comorbidity Index provides pre-
defined weights for each of the comorbidities. We applied
these weights to the set of diagnoses of each hospital and
determined a case-mix index for each hospital. We rescaled
the index to provide values between 0 and 1 used this case-
mix index to risk-adjust both of the output variables for the
DEA models by multiplying each of the variables INPA-
TIENT and 1-MORTALITY with the case-mix index. An-
other common approach would have been to use a case-mix
index whose weight reflected the relative costliness of
DRGs. Carey [43, 44], however, reported that individual-
level measures represent a vast improvement over such
aggregate case-mix measures when controlling for patient
heterogeneity.
A correlation analysis showed that our multiple inputs were
positively correlated with our output set. This is an important
prerequisite for applying DEA. In the present study, the input
variables, in particular, were highly correlated, which suggests
that a limited number of inputs might have been sufficient to
represent the selected input set in our efficiency assessment.
Several authors (e.g., Dyson et al. [45]; Jacobs et al. [38]),
however, emphasize that correlation is an aggregate measure
of the closeness of two sets of observed data and argue that
omitting a highly correlated variable can lead to significant
changes in efficiency estimates. As a result, variations in the
input levels for individual hospitals may have little impact on
the correlation while significantly affecting the measured ef-
ficiency. A comprehensive set of inputs and outputs may also
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increase the chance of identifying the presence of a production
technology common to all decision-making units. In addition,
Dyson et al. [45] argue that omitting variables to increase
discrimination is less effective when using large data samples.
Based on these considerations, we chose to use all of our input
variables for the DEA model. Table 1 shows the descriptive
statistics for in- and outputs of our sample used in the DEA
models stratified according to the intervention and control
groups.
3.2 Propensity score matching
The difference-in-difference estimator has the advantage of
eliminating unobserved time-invariant hospital-level effects
between privatized and non-privatized hospitals. It does not,
however, address the problem of potential baseline imbal-
ance between these two groups, which can be caused when
large differences in group characteristics prior to privatiza-
tion lead to selection bias. For instance, if only smaller
hospitals are sold by the state, this may result into smaller
hospitals in the intervention group of privatized compared to
the control group of non-privatized hospitals. In the case of
baseline imbalance, results may be very sensitive to the
model specification, and regression analysis may effectively
extrapolate outside the support of the data. Methods such as
propensity score matching have been shown to avoid unre-
liable inference in parametric models. For example, if pri-
vatized hospitals are systematically smaller than the control
group of non-privatized hospitals and we assume that
smaller hospitals are generally less efficient than larger
hospitals, efficiency gains after privatization will be smaller
than they would have been without selection by size, i.e.
providing equal hospital sizes in both groups. Whereas the
use of matching estimators alone is usually unsatisfactory
due to the strong assumption that selection is based only on
observables, several authors have proposed that a combina-
tion of difference-in-difference and propensity score match-
ing methods significantly increases the quality of non-
experimental evaluation results [46, 47].
We thus applied a propensity score matching approach
proposed by Rosenbaum [7] and Rubin [8, 9] and extracted
a sub-sample of non-privatized hospitals in which the dis-
tribution of covariates was similar to that in our sample of
privatized hospitals. In the first step, we estimated the con-
ditional probability that any hospital in the two samples had
been privatized during the study period given the vector of
our defined covariates. The propensity scores were derived
by performing a logistic regression. In order to achieve a
propensity score model that minimizes the conditional bias,
it is important to determine predictors and confounders of
the intervention–outcome relationship and to identify pre-
dictors of exposure, i.e. we determined variables with sig-
nificant effect on the probability of being privatized [48]. To
determine appropriate predictors of exposure, we tested
different variables in the logistic regression models, allow-
ing for interactions between variables (for a detailed descrip-
tion of the variables, see Section 3.3). Subsequently, we
calculated the predicted probabilities of belonging to the
sample of privatized hospitals. Based on this score, each
privatized hospital was matched to one non-privatized hos-
pital in the corresponding baseline year (i.e. one year before
the privatization occurred). Because the propensity score
was the only pre-intervention measurement, the matching
algorithm minimized the absolute differences in propensity
score [49]. By using one-to-one matching with replacement
i.e. each hospital in the control group could be drawn more
than once, the total distance between matched pairs was also
minimized; known as optimal matching, this method
ensures that conditional bias is reduced to a minimum [7,
9, 50]. The number of pairs in the matched sample was
further restricted by using calipers of width equal to 0.2 of
the standard deviation. A comparison of different caliper
widths found that this width was superior to others at reduc-
ing conditional bias in the estimation of intervention effects
[51].
We assessed the appropriateness of our propensity score
matching by using standardized differences for continuous
variables and differences for non-continuous variables as
recommended by Austin [48]. Standardized differences rep-
resent a good measure of appropriateness for the matching
procedure, as they depend neither on the unit of measure-
ment nor on the size of the sample [52]. Furthermore, we
applied Hotelling’s T-square statistic to test the reliability of
our propensity score matching. Whereas standardized differ-
ences and differences rely on the cross-sample difference of
each variable included in the propensity score matching
model, Hotelling’s T-square test considers whether these
differences can be taken as jointly insignificant. In the
present study, we divided the sample by propensity score
quartiles and conducted the test for each sub-sample [53].
3.3 Difference-in-difference estimates
In our regression analysis, we applied a generalized linear
regression model for truncated longitudinal data with DEA
efficiency scores as dependent variable. A difference-in-
difference specification of the regression model was used to
assess whether privatization led to improvements in efficiency
while controlling for patient heterogeneity and the impact of
hospital organizational and environmental characteristics.
Truncated regression models were chosen owing to the trun-
cated distribution of the DEA-based relative efficiency esti-
mates [10]. All of our difference-in-difference regressions
were modeled with fixed effects and random effects because
the results of the Breusch–Pagan andHausman tests suggested
that the assumption of the random effects specification was
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also appropriate. The fixed effects estimator generally pro-
vides more consistent estimates and may pick up much of the
unobserved heterogeneity in the hospital-specific effect. Be-
cause of this, the fixed effects estimator was our preferred
model. Therefore we only report the fixed effects regression
results. Our model was as follows:
ϑit ¼ b0 þ b1PRIVi þ b2POSTit þ b3PRIViPOSTit
þ b4Zit þ ui þ "it ð2Þ
where ϑit is the efficiency of the ith hospital at yeart, t01,
…,13; PRIVi is a dummy variable for privatization, with PRIVi
being assigned a value of 1 if a hospital was privatized at any
time between 1997 and 2007 and a value of 0 if not; POSTt is
assigned a value of 1 in the years after privatization and 0
before the year during which the hospital changed its status to
private for-profit or private non-profit; and Zit are observable
factors affecting the efficiency of hospital i at year t (i.e.
hospital characteristics, environmental characteristics, and pa-
tient heterogeneity) ui is the fixed effect. The random term εit
is assumed to be gamma distributed.
The variable PRIVi was included to control for time-
invariant differences between privatized hospitals in the
intervention group (i.e. hospitals that were converted from
public to private for-profit or private non-profit status) and
non-privatized hospitals in the control group. The coeffi-
cient of interest is the interaction between PRIVi and POSTt,
which identifies changes in efficiency after a hospital was
privatized relative to efficiency in the comparator group.
The difference-in-difference methodology assumes that all
other temporal factors affecting hospital efficiency had the
same impact on hospitals in the intervention group as they
did on hospitals in the control group. We thus assume that
any changes over time for which we did not control affected
all hospitals in the same way. For sensitivity purposes, and
to check the robustness of our estimates, we allowed for four
alternative post-privatization periods (i.e. first, second, third,
and fourth year). The pre-period was defined as the year
before privatization occurred and alternatively year 2 before
privatization was used.
An important assumption in our study was that environ-
mental and organizational factors can influence the efficiency
of hospitals in addition to a change in ownership status. We
assert that considering the impact of such covariates on hos-
pital efficiency provides a better explanation of variation in
efficiency and more robust findings on the post-acquisition
effects of privatization than the approaches taken in previous
studies on this topic, none of which controlled for these
effects. The use of control variables is of particular importance
when examining the hospital market because there are usually
a range of structural and regulatory determinants of efficiency
that a hospital itself cannot influence. Table 2 provides a
comprehensive outline of our statistical analysis.
In the second stage of our analysis, heterogeneity in
hospital characteristics was covered by several variables.
The first of these was the number of licensed and staffed
beds (BEDS), an approach taken in previous studies to
control for hospital size [54–56]. In the context of hospital
planning in Germany, the number of beds per hospital can
be seen, at least over the medium term, as an exogenous
factor that is not under the direct control of hospital man-
agement. To account for higher resource consumption due to
differences in teaching activities, we included a variable
(TEACHING) for the training activities of non-medical
staff. These activities are represented by the ratio of trainee
positions and the sum of all non-medical personnel. Another
important point to consider is that hospitals in Germany are
allowed to lease hospital beds to self-employed private-
practice physicians, although the vast majority of hospital
physicians in Germany are employees. The self-employed
physicians use the hospital facilities to provide inpatient
care. The DEA efficiency scores calculated in the first stage
of our analysis were higher for hospitals that had leased beds
because the cases referred to these physicians had been
counted as hospital output (i.e. inpatient cases), whereas
the corresponding resource use in terms of physicians had
not been considered on the input side. To control for this, we
defined the proportion of all hospital beds that had been
leased (LEASED BEDS) as a variable in our regression
models.
The set of explanatory variables representing the different
environmental characteristics were as follows: The
Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI) was applied, which
measures competitive pressure in a hospital’s market and
is a standard economic measure of market concentration.
The market area was defined as the county in which a
hospital was located, which is a frequently used definition
in hospital studies [57–61]. Although there has been some
controversy about the most appropriate way to define a
hospital’s market area, Garnick et al. [62] reported that for
the purpose of measuring competitive activity it makes little
difference whether a hospital’s market is defined as a county
or a radius. The HHI is obtained by squaring a hospital’s
regional market share (reflected by the distribution of treated
cases) and subsequently summing the market shares of
admissions for all of the hospitals in a given county. The
higher the HHI, the more concentrated the regional market.
We used HHI to measure the effects from the changes over
time in a hospital’s competitive environment. This specifi-
cation allowed us to differentiate between the effects of
privatization and the effects of changes in market structure
resulting from health care reforms. In recent years, the most
significant reform in the German hospital market was the
introduction of a new system of reimbursement based on
DRGs. The chief motivation behind this fundamental over-
haul of the old reimbursement system, which was based on
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per diem charges, was to create financial incentives that
would increase hospital efficiency [63]. We thus defined a
dummy variable (DRG), which was assigned a value of 1 in
the DRG era (i.e. 2003 through 2007).
These variables for hospital and environmental character-
istics were also used in the propensity score model, as were
the case-mix index (CMXI) derived from the Elixhauser
Comorbidity Index [42] and the pre-privatization efficiency
(EFFICIENCY) of privatized and non-privatized hospitals.
We used this last variable to minimize potential bias because
public entities may prefer to sell hospitals characterized by
lower levels of efficiency while keeping those that are
performing well. Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics
for the variables used in the second stage analysis stratified
according to the intervention and control groups.
3.4 Sample
The data for our study were derived from the annual hospital
reports collected and administered by the Research Data
Centre of the Statistical Offices of the Länder. This rich
dataset covers all public, private for-profit, and private
non-profit hospitals in Germany and contains hospital-
level information on cost and hospital infrastructure, as well
as patient-level information on age, diagnoses, and proce-
dures performed. Our study is based on data from the years
1996 through 2008, and the unit of analysis was the hospi-
tal. Due to data privacy issues, we were able to obtain
randomly selected data for only two-thirds of German acute
care hospitals (n01,878). To ensure the comparability of the
hospitals in the sample, the following institutions were
excluded from further analysis: hospitals providing only
psychiatric care; university hospitals; day clinics; hospitals
with fewer than 50 beds or more than 2000 beds; and private
non-profit and private for-profit hospitals that had been
privatized before the study period. In addition, manual plau-
sibility checks were conducted to identify any measurement
errors. Ultimately, a total of 548 public hospitals remained
in our sample, including 132 that were privatized between
1997 and 2007. Of these 132 hospitals, 99 were acquired by
Table 3 Descriptive statistics of variables used for the second stage analysis for the matched sample
Period t−1 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
For-profit
Number of hospitals n099 n099 n090 n077 n066
BEDS 344 (268) 344 (273) 332 (261) 327 (262) 342 (272)
LEASED BEDS 0.037 (0.074) 0.032 (0.073) 0.028 (0.050) 0.026 (0.047) 0.024 (0.047)
TEACHING 0.146 (0.154) 0.171 (0.177) 0.162 (0.191) 0.177 (0.202) 0.129 (0.147)
CMXI 0.161 (0.063) 0.155 (0.061) 0.160 (0.056) 0.154 (0.052) 0.147 (0.048)
EFFICIENCY 0.761 (0.122) 0.757 (0.121) 0.772 (0.123) 0.774 (0.114) 0.772 (0.117)
HHI 0.399 (0.294) 0.393 (0.284) 0.413 (0.291) 0.450 (0.288) 0.443 (0.267)
Non-profit
Number of hospitals n033 n033 n024 n023 n022
BEDS 237 (179) 232 (189) 264 (220) 267 (214) 274 (216)
LEASED BEDS 0.060 (0.067) 0.055 (0.064) 0.037 (0.047) 0.039 (0.047) 0.055 (0.097)
TEACHING 0.151 (0.156) 0.165 (0.159) 0.141 (0.151) 0.182 (0.125) 0.099 (0.138)
CMXI 0.141 (0.042) 0.146 (0.044) 0.142 (0.043) 0.128 (0.034) 0.132 (0.037)
EFFICIENCY 0.730 (0.144) 0.757 (0.131) 0.743 (0.129) 0.738 (0.140) 0.716 (0.157)
HHI 0.404 (0.210) 0.439 (0.253) 0.463 (0.274) 0.469 (0.278) 0.475 (0.285)
Control
Number of hospitals n0128 n0128 n0113 n099 n087
BEDS 332 (257) 329 (256) 336 (257) 321 (248) 319 (250)
LEASED BEDS 0.048 (0.078) 0.045 (0.078) 0.047 (0.083) 0.043 (0.078) 0.051 (0.094)
TEACHING 0.148 (0.153) 0.146 (0.158) 0.148 (0.158) 0.142 (0.154) 0.146 (0.160)
CMXI 0.162 (0.072) 0.162 (0.070) 0.160 (0.067) 0.154 (0.050) 0.157 (0.061)
EFFICIENCY 0.765 (0.127) 0.746 (0.121) 0.750 (0.129) 0.747 (0.133) 0.747 (0.119)
HHI 0.390 (0.231) 0.394 (0.241) 0.395 (0.242) 0.390 (0.249) 0.398 (0.247)
t−1 is defined as the year before privatization occurred, while t+1, t+2, t+3 and t+4 represent the four post-privatization years.
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a private for-profit organization and 33 were acquired by a
private non-profit organization [64]. Table 4 shows the
number of hospital privatizations per year.
4 Findings and discussion
Table 5 shows the degree of imbalance before and after
propensity score matching for our subset of covariates
(interactions are not shown).
The differences in covariate means between the un-
matched samples indicate that it was especially the size of
non-privatized hospitals (in terms of beds) that was likely to
be larger than that of privatized hospitals. After propensity
score matching, the differences in covariate means between
the privatized and non-privatized hospitals were substantial-
ly smaller than those seen in the pre-matching distribution.
All of the differences between the groups were less than 6%
in the post-matching distribution. Table 6 summarizes the
results of Hotelling’s T-square test. Reassuringly, the bal-
ancing conditions were satisfied within each propensity
score quartile (i.e. the P values for all quartiles were sub-
stantially higher than 0.10).
The regression results for our first model, which used
DEA efficiency scores as dependent variable in the regres-
sions, are summarized in Table 7 and stratified according to
whether public hospitals were converted to private for-profit
or private non-profit status. Two sets of regression results
are shown for each type of conversion: one based on the
unmatched samples and the other based on the samples after
propensity score matching. The coefficients shown in Ta-
ble 7 are those for the difference-in-difference interaction
between the variables PRIV and POST and can be inter-
preted as marginal effects. The interaction terms identify the
changes in efficiency after a hospital was privatized relative
to changes in efficiency in the comparator group.
The regression results for public hospitals that were con-
verted to private for-profit status show that there was a
significant increase in efficiency compared to the control
group starting the second year after privatization in the
unmatched sample and even in the first year after privatiza-
tion in the matched sample. Throughout all estimations of
our efficiency model, the effects of this change in status
increased with the number of years after privatization. For
instance, four years after their conversion to private for-
profit status, the formerly public hospitals experienced an
increase in efficiency that was 2.9 to 4.9% greater than that
seen among non-privatized hospitals over the same period.
In the matched samples, the standard errors were larger than
in the pre-matched sample. This can be attributed, in part, to
the smaller size of the control group; nevertheless, the
general finding remained the same. The estimations also
suggest that the increase in efficiency seen in public hospi-
tals that were converted to private for-profit status is perma-
nent and not simply a transitional phenomenon after which
hospital operations revert to their pre-privatization state.
In the unmatched sample, the regression results for public
hospitals that were converted to private non-profit status
show that, at least in the first year after privatization, there
was a significant increase in efficiency of 2.9% compared to
the control group. For years 2 through 4 after privatization,
we observed no significant effects apart from those seen in
year 2 and 3 in the matched sample. In the matched sample,
public hospitals converted to private non-profit status
showed a significant increase in efficiency of 5.3% in the
second year after privatization and 4.5% in the third year
after privatization compared to the non-privatized hospitals.
Throughout most estimations, however, the effects of a
conversion to private non-profit status decreased as the
number of years after privatization increased. This points
to a transitory rather than a permanent effect.
To gain a better understanding of these findings and the
restructuring that occurred after hospitals were converted to
private for-profit and non-profit status in our sample, we
conducted a series of exploratory regressions. Using the
same model specification to identify the effect of privatiza-
tion on the quantity and type of resource use (i.e. employing
input variables from the first-stage analysis as dependent
variables of the second-stage regression) compared to the
non-privatized public hospitals, we found that hospitals that
were converted to private for-profit status substantially re-
duced all of the analyzed labor inputs during the post-
privatization period with the exception of physicians and
administrative staff (i.e. nursing staff, other clinical staff and
other nonclinical staff). This finding can potentially be
explained by the two lines of internal authority—medical
and managerial—that characterize most hospitals: In
Table 4 Number of hospital privatizations per year
Period Number of privatizations
Total Non-profit For-profit
1997 15 5 10
1998 13 8 5
1999 7 0 7
2000 4 2 2
2001 15 0 15
2002 13 2 11
2003 14 3 11
2004 11 2 9
2005 13 1 12
2006 16 2 14
2007 11 8 3
Total 132 33 99
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contrast to nurses and technical staff, physicians are often
part of the top management and make decisions on the
allocation of resources. Being clinicians or former clinicians
themselves, members of top management may be predis-
posed to avoiding reductions in the number of physicians.
Another explanation may be that avoiding physician lay-
offs is a strategy to reduce resistance to change by compen-
sating physicians for coping with the organizational adjust-
ments associated with privatization. For hospitals converted
to non-profit status reductions of labor input tend to be
smaller compared to conversions to for-profit status. Figure 1
shows the changes in staffing and supplies per case-mix-
adjusted inpatient hospital case that can be seen four years
after the conversion to private for-profit or non-profit status
compared to the control group of non-privatized hospitals.
We use the fixed effects specification based on the matched
sample for these illustrations.
To explore our results yet further, we examined the
interaction effects between a given privatization (differ-
ence-in-difference coefficient) and the competitive environ-
ment (HHI) in which this privatization took place. In their
summary of the theoretical literature, Sheshinski and López-
Calva [65] argue that privatized organizations are likely to
have lower efficiency gains in non-competitive markets than
they would under the discipline of a competitive market.
They assume that organizations in monopolistic or oligopo-
listic markets restrict output and have higher average costs
and lower efficiency than competitive organizations. Rosko
[58–60] and Rosko and Chilingerian [61], however, have
found that efficiency in the US hospital sector is negatively
related to market competition. Using HHI as a proxy for
competition in our present study, we were unable to observe
any effect of this variable on efficiency after privatization.
We also examined the interaction effects between privat-
ization and the introduction of yardstick competition
through DRGs in the year 2004 in Germany. There is reason
to believe that efficiency gains are larger for privatizations
after the introduction of yardstick competition, especially in
the case of hospitals converted to private for-profit status
[63, 66–68]. We used a dummy variable to model the pre-
DRG and the DRG period. In doing so, we defined each of
the years 2001 through 2004 as the cut-off point between
pre-DRG and DRG periods because hospitals may have
changed their behavior after the introduction of DRGs or
beforehand based on their knowledge of the new system and
its upcoming implementation. Table 8 summarizes the
corresponding regression results based on a fixed effects
regression model.
The regression results for hospitals that were converted to
private for-profit status reveal a significant negative associ-
ation between post-privatization performance and the intro-
duction of DRGs. In particular, the efficiency gains seen in
hospitals converted to private for-profit status were substan-
tially lower in the DRG era compared to those seen in the
control group. The introduction of DRGs induced yardstick
competition in the German hospital market, setting strong
incentives to increase efficiency and stimulating restructur-
ing efforts across all types of ownership. Our findings thus
suggest that it became more challenging for hospitals that
were converted to private for-private status in the DRG era
to realize further efficiency gains. In the model estimated for
hospitals that were converted to private non-profit status, the
interaction term between post-privatization performance and
the introduction of DRGs was not significant.
The results of our regression analyses for for-profit and
non-profit privatization indicate that the efficiency effects of
Table 5 Balance in measured covariates before and after matching
Group Unmatched sample Matched sample
Control (n0361) Intervention (n0132) di Control (n0128) Intervention (n0132) di
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Variable name
BEDS 351 (259) 317 (252) 12.89% 332 (257) 317 (252) 5.68%
LEASED BEDS 0.069 (0.091) 0.043 (0.073) 2.60% 0.048 (0.078) 0.043 (0.073) 0.50%
TEACHING 0.169 (0.172) 0.147 (0.154) 2.20% 0.148 (0.153) 0.147 (0.154) 0.10%
CMXI 0.157 (0.058) 0.156 (0.059) 0.10% 0.162 (0.072) 0.156 (0.059) 0.60%
EFFICIENCY 0.772 (0.111) 0.753 (0.128) 1.90% 0.765 (0.127) 0.753 (0.128) 1.20%
HHI 0.401 (0.242) 0.400 (0.275) 0.10% 0.390 (0.231) 0.400 (0.275) 1.00%
Table 6 Results from Hotelling’s T square test by propensity score
quartile
Quartile T squared statistics F test statistics P values
FIRST 3.593 0.551 0.768
SECOND 4.647 0.712 0.641
THIRD 4.066 0.615 0.717
FOURTH 4.933 0.746 0.615
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privatization depend on the type of privatization. There are
several potential reasons for-profit hospitals generating per-
manent efficiency gains after privatization while non-profit
hospitals do not. Our results show that public hospitals that
were converted to private for-profit status realized their
substantial efficiency gains by markedly reducing all labor
inputs (with the exception of physicians and administrative
staff) and expenditure on supplies. In contrast, non-profit
privatization only had a significant negative effect on the
non-medical categories of personnel and expenditure on
supplies. In short, the employment-reducing effect of for-
profit privatization, especially in terms of the medical cate-
gories of staff (i.e. nursing staff and other clinical staff) was
larger than that of non-profit privatization. These findings
are similar to those of Picone et al. [26], and Shen [28].
Regarding the incentive structures of private non-profit pro-
viders, agency theory and property-rights theory predict that
the owners and managers of non-profit organizations fre-
quently diverge from cost- or inefficiency-minimizing be-
havior and instead maximize quality, quantity, and/or
prestige [69, 70]. In other words, private non-profit hospitals
may avoid reductions in staff with the intention to avoid
reductions in the quality of care. The positive relationship
between the staff-to-patient ratio and quality of care has
been confirmed previously by a number of studies (e.g.,
Aiken et al. [71, 72]). Therefore, other measures not con-
sidered in our analyses, such as patient satisfaction or other
measures of quality of care, might have led to different
results.
In line with the evidence found in studies from other
countries, especially the U.S., the evidence from Germany
suggests that private for-profit ownership is associated with
a strong focus on profit-maximization [20, 73, 74]. Accord-
ing to agency theory, the owners of private for-profit hospi-
tals may use profits as their measure of a manager’s success
and can limit divergences from their interest by making the
manager’s compensation a positive function of these profits
and are thus more likely to achieve greater efficiency [69,
75–77]. The income of physicians in private for-profit hos-
pitals can also be tied to a hospital’s financial performance.
Within public and private non-profit hospitals, the income
of individual decision makers is rarely tied to a hospital’s
performance, creating little incentive to enforce strong effi-
cient behavior.
Further it should be considered that in the pre-DRG era
private for-profit hospitals tended to focus on revenues in
order to earn profits and were able to generate significantly
higher revenues per case than hospitals with other forms of
ownership [73, 74]. As the development of the German DRG-
system progresses options to focus on revenues substantially
Table 7 Regression results for
the efficiency model
*P≤0.10; **P≤0.05; ***P≤
0.01; SE in parentheses
Post-privatization year Public->For-profit Public->Non-profit
Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched
1st year after privatization 0.005 (0.008) 0.021** (0.011) 0.029** (0.012) 0.050** (0.021)
2nd year after privatization 0.019** (0.008) 0.036*** (0.011) 0.017 (0.015) 0.053** (0.024)
3rd year after privatization 0.023*** (0.009) 0.041*** (0.013) 0.020 (0.015) 0.045* (0.024)






























* P 0.10; ** P 0.05; *** P 0.01;
Fig. 1 Changes in staffing
(FTEs) and expenditure on
supplies per case after
conversion to for-profit or non-
profit status compared to the
control group. Note: Changes in
staffing and supplies per case-
mix-adjusted inpatient hospital
case four years after conversion
to for-profit or non-profit status
compared to the control group
of non-privatized hospitals.
FTE full-time equivalents
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decreased over the last years and thus especially private for-
profit hospitals are very likely to increase their focus on
efficiency as a kind of compensation. However, the generated
profits allowed private for-profit hospitals to substantially
invest in their hospital infrastructure that also might have
positively affected the efficiency of their service production
processes. In addition, private for-profit hospitals started ear-
lier than private non-profit hospitals to specialize on certain
diagnoses or procedures in order to realize economies of scale.
Finally, these hospitals also tend to form chains and networks
with other hospitals realizing better capabilities to negotiate
with sickness funds and exploiting economies of scale for
example by transferring knowledge or centralizing the pur-
chase of supplies [78].
We tested the robustness of our findings in several ways.
First, we employed the average in-hospital mortality rate as
an additional output to adjust for variations in the quality of
care between hospitals [41]. The results of our quality-
adjusted efficiency model show that employing in-hospital
mortality as an additional output was not associated with
smaller efficiency gains (see Table 9 for the regression
results of the quality-adjusted efficiency model). In fact,
the regression results for hospitals that were converted to
private for-profit status showed that there was even a small
increase in coefficients compared to the estimations of the
efficiency model. Our findings therefore do not provide any
evidence that increases in technical efficiency come at the
expense of the quality of care. This may be due to a decrease
over the past decade in the asymmetry of information about
the quality of care in the German hospital sector following
several health care reforms that have aimed to improve
quality assurance, such as the introduction of mandatory
quality reports. Furthermore, it is important to consider that
privatized hospitals are often located in very competitive
regions with substantial overcapacities, which may increase
the importance of quality of care as a parameter of compe-
tition. Indeed, there is evidence that private for-profit hos-
pitals have improved their quality management and hospital
outcomes precisely in order to attract patients in such set-
tings [79].
Second, we re-estimated all second-stage regressions by
incorporating firm fixed effects as an additional dimension.
To do so, we estimated time and firm fixed effects as a
multi-way clustered regression [80]. This resulted in only
minor changes in the difference-in-difference coefficients,
and our findings remained robust throughout the models.
Third, in other economic sectors, Parker and Martin [81]
found that pre-privatization gains in efficiency can be even
larger than post-privatization gains. Based on this finding,
there is reason to assume that local governments make
efforts to increase the efficiency of public hospitals prior
to privatization to generate higher sales revenue, reducing
potential gains in efficiency after privatization. In order to
take account of this possibility, we re-ran our models, allow-
ing an alternative pre-privatization period of two years. The
direction of the difference-in-difference coefficients did not
change throughout the models, and standard errors increased
only slightly due to the reduced sample size. Bias due to pre-
privatization efficiency gains was thus unlikely. Fourth we
re-estimated our DEA models after eliminating those inputs
(physicians and other clinical staff) having a strong correla-
tion (r>0.90) to other inputs used in the full DEA model.
Thus, we performed 3 alternative DEA models: 1) without
physicians, 2) without other clinical staff, 3) without physi-
cians and other clinical staff. All other steps remained
unchained. In the re-estimated regression models the
Table 8 Changes in efficiency after privatization in the DRG era compared to the pre-DRG era
Post-privatization period Matched sample
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
Public->For-profit
2001 cut-off point −0.020 (0.016) −0.019 (0.018) −0.051*** (0.020) 0.012 (0.028)
2002 cut-off point −0.021 (0.014) −0.012 (0.018) −0.037** (0.018) −0.035 (0.022)
2003 cut-off point −0.018 (0.014) −0.032** (0.015) −0.037** (0.018) −0.039** (0.019)
2004 cut-off point −0.026* (0.014) −0.023* (0.015) −0.047*** (0.016) −0.042** (0.018)
Public->Non-profit
2001 cut-off point −0.015 (0.031) −0.001 (0.038) −0.030 (0.031) −0.035 (0.055)
2002 cut-off point −0.015 (0.031) −0.026 (0.037) −0.030 (0.033) −0.057* (0.035)
2003 cut-off point −0.015 (0.031) −0.026 (0.037) −0.050 (0.033) −0.057* (0.035)
2004 cut-off point −0.003 (0.033) −0.049 (0.036) −0.050 (0.033) −0.076** (0.035)
*P≤0.10; **P≤0.05; ***P≤0.01; SE in parentheses
t−1 is defined as the year before privatization occurred, while t+1, t+2, t+3 and t+4 represent the four post-privatization years.
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coefficients and standard errors hardly changed compared to
the full models. The only change occurred in model 3)
where standard errors were smaller for non-profit privatiza-
tion in the 3rd year after privatization. This likely reason for
this effect is that variation of both these inputs across hos-
pitals is larger than for most other inputs. Fifth, one could
argue that our multi-step procedure to generate results may
move the sample too far away from reality. Therefore, we
added a further sensitivity analysis to show that results are
robust even if we drastically reduce the numbers of steps
performed in our analysis. In doing so, we estimated a
model with the following specifications: We re-estimated
the DEA model without risk-adjusted cases as output. 2) We
proceeded without bootstrapping. 3) We estimated the re-
gression based on the unmatched samples i.e. eliminated the
matching step. We still see large and significant efficiency
gains after for-profit privatizations, coefficients are slightly
lower and standard errors tend to be larger. Altogether our
study results are very robust to model changes.
Our study has a number of strengths compared to previ-
ous investigations of hospital ownership conversions. First,
to our knowledge, it is the first quantitative study to examine
the effects of privatization on technical efficiency using a
panel data approach based on bootstrapped DEA efficiency
scores. Second, our study employs a difference-in-
difference matching approach to address problems arising
both from causal inference and time-invariant differences.
Third, our sample of privatized hospitals is large (n0132),
providing greater statistical power and more robust esti-
mates than the analyses conducted in previous studies. Fi-
nally, our sample is rich, consisting of a large set of
environmental and organizational characteristics. This is
likely to have yielded more consistent results because it
allowed us to control appropriately for determinants of
efficiency other than the privatization event.
Our study also has several important limitations. First,
additional inputs (e.g., capital) and additional outputs (e.g.,
hospital outpatient cases) would have improved our model
of the hospital production process. Considering the number
of hospital outpatient cases in addition to inpatient cases is
often recommended in order to measure patient care output
[38]. Although we had intended to include a proxy for
hospital outpatient activities in our analysis (e.g., outpatient
surgery), data inconsistencies and measurement errors pre-
vented us from doing so. Second, including explanatory
factors in addition to environmental and organizational char-
acteristics might have provided a better explanation of var-
iation in our estimates, thus potentially affecting our
interpretation of the relationship between privatization and
organizational efficiency. Third, our study relies on in-
hospital mortality data and does not take post-hospital mor-
tality into account, which clearly would have been prefera-
ble. This being said, Rosenthal et al. [82] found that (a) in-
hospital mortality data were not biased by discharge practi-
ces and (b) using in-hospital mortality as a measure of a
hospital’s quality of care leads to results similar to those
obtained with 30 days post-hospital mortality. It should also
be considered that mortality represents only one dimension
of quality. There are numerous other ways of measuring
quality of care, e.g., adherence to guidelines, waiting time,
patient satisfaction, which would be worth including in a
more comprehensive quality-adjusted DEA model. Howev-
er, by using the above mentioned data set we are constrained
to mortality as a proxy for quality. Thus, our quality-
adjusted DEA model is not able to provide a comprehensive
picture of the overall quality of care hospitals provide and
one should take these limitations into consideration when
drawing conclusions based on quality-adjusted efficiency.
Moreover, one should generally be careful when interpret-
ing quality-adjusted efficiency in a way that patients may
find it acceptable to receive a lower quality of care if
efficiency is high [83]. In this study the quality-adjusted
efficiency model is only meant to serve as robustness check
to show that efficiency gains after privatization do not
change completely if mortality as one dimension of quality
of care is considered in our models. Fourth, for sensitivity
purposes it would have been preferable to use SFA in
addition to DEA. When comparing DEA to SFA, however,
Linna [84] and Webster et al. [85] found that both methods
yielded comparable results when measuring hospital effi-
ciency. Fifth, in DEA model II, we used 1 minus the in-
hospital mortality rate per year, which represents an index
variable. Syrjänen [39] found that mixing index and volume
measures in DEA may lead to biased results for the most




0.01; SE in parentheses
Public->For-profit Public->Non-profit
Post-privatization year Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched
1st year after privatization 0.004 (0.008) 0.024** (0.011) 0.028** (0.012) 0.049** (0.021)
2nd year after privatization 0.022*** (0.008) 0.037*** (0.011) 0.015 (0.015) 0.050** (0.024)
3rd year after privatization 0.025*** (0.009) 0.043*** (0.013) 0.019 (0.015) 0.042* (0.024)
4th year after privatization 0.031*** (0.009) 0.055*** (0.013) 0.002 (0.017) 0.022 (0.027)
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commonly used constant returns to scale variant of the
Banker and Moorey (BM) model and Charnes, Cooper,
and Rhodes (CCR) model. This problem does not apply in
our context, however, because we used a variable returns to
scale variant of the BCC model [39, 86]. Finally, although
we improve over other studies by considering a measure for
differences in case-mix among hospitals there are reasons to
believe that certain potentially important differences are not
captured by this measure. For instance, multimorbidity of
patients and the resource use associated with this are often
not adequately captured by case-mix measures such as the
Elixhauser Index.
5 Conclusions
In the present study, we investigated the post-acquisition
effects of privatization on hospital efficiency in Germany.
Our findings show that hospitals converted to private for-
profit status showed an increase in efficiency after privat-
ization that was significantly higher than that realized by
their non-privatized counterparts over the same period. We
defined four alternative post-privatization periods (i.e. first,
second, third, and fourth year) and found that the increase in
efficiency after conversion to private for-profit status did not
appear to be transitory. Our results show, that hospitals that
were converted to private for-profit status realized their
substantial efficiency gains by markedly reducing all labor
inputs (with the exception of physicians and administrative
staff) and expenditure on supplies. The results of our study,
which remained robust when considering in-hospital mor-
tality as an additional output, do not support frequently
voiced concerns that efficiency gains after conversion to
private for-profit status are realized at the expense of quality
of care. Taking the effect of the introduction of DRG pay-
ments into account, it is striking that the efficiency gains of
hospitals converted to private for-profit status were signifi-
cantly lower during the DRG era. We also observed an
increase in efficiency one year after hospitals were con-
verted to private non-profit status, but our estimations sug-
gest that this effect is transitory and that hospitals converted
to private for-profit status follow a different restructuring
strategy than that pursued by their private non-profit
counterparts.
Our results indicate that converting hospitals to private
for-profit status may be an effective way to ensure better
allocation of resources in the hospital sector. Before drawing
policy implications, however, a number of issues must be
considered. In some cases, public hospitals converted to
private non-profit status may not be restructured with the
intention of increasing efficiency, but rather with the aim of
improving the patient experience, including the quality of
care. Although our results remained robust when
considering in-hospital mortality for hospitals converted to
private non-profit status, other measures not considered in
our analysis, such as patient satisfaction, may have led to
different results after the privatization event. Moreover, it
should also be taken into consideration that the time needed
to develop new quality assurance systems in privatized
hospitals may be longer than the period we considered in
our study. Additional research is needed to investigate the
long-term effects of privatization and to examine the deci-
sions behind the approaches taken by private for-profit and
private non-profit organizations in their restructuring of
public hospitals.
Given the increasing importance of privatization in health
systems in Germany and beyond, further studies are needed to
investigate the effects of privatization on efficiency and dif-
ferent dimensions of care quality. Outside the hospital sector,
privatization activity is also increasing in laboratory diagnos-
tics, nursing care and rehabilitative services. The approach
used in our study may be useful in investigating privatization
in these other areas of care. In addition, future research should
go beyond the standard administrative hospital data base to
further explain the wide variation in hospital efficiency after
privatization which may be due to hospital decision making,
market spillover effects or other reasons.
Acknowledgment This study was supported by a research grant
from the Federal Ministry for Research and Education (BMBF) in
Germany (grant number: BMBF 01FL10055). The sponsor had no role
in the study design, collection and analysis of data, the writing of the
report or the submission of the paper for publication. In addition, the
authors would like to thank the Munich Center of Health Sciences
(MC-Health) for interesting discussions and helpful comments.
Conflict of interest The authors have no conflict of interest that is
directly related to the content of this study.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the
source are credited.
References
1. Burns LR, Shah RJ, Sloan FA, Powell AC (2009) The impact of
hospital ownership conversions: review of the literature and results
from a comparative field study. In: Savage GT, Fottler MD (eds)
Advances in health care management—volume 8. Emerald Group
Publishing, Bingley, pp 171–229
2. Megginson WL, Netter JM (2001) From state to market: a survey
of empirical studies on privatization. J Econ Lit 39:321–389
3. Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2009) Fachserie 12 Reihe




templateId0renderPrint.psml. Accessed 24 June 2011
Changes in hospital efficiency after privatization
4. Busse R, Riesberg A (2004) Health care systems in transition:
Germany. European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies,
Copenhagen
5. Simar L, Wilson PW (1998) Sensitivity analysis of efficiency
scores: how to bootstrap in nonparametric frontier models. Manag
Sci 44:49–61
6. Simar L, Wilson PW (2000) A general methodology for boot-
strapping in non-parametric frontier models. J Appl Stat 27:779–
802
7. Rosenbaum P (2002) Observational studies. Springer, New York
8. Rubin DB (1973) The use of matched sampling and regression
adjustment to remove bias in observational studies. Biometrics
29:185–203
9. Rubin DB (2006) Matched sampling for causal effects. Cambridge
University Press, New York
10. Simar L, Wilson PW (2007) Estimation and inference in two-stage,
semi-parametric models of production processes. J Econ 136:31–
64
11. Haskel J, Szymanski S (1993) Privatization, liberalization, wages
and employment: theory and evidence for the UK. Economica
60:161–182
12. Shleifer A, Vishny RW (1994) Politicians and firms. Q J Econ
109:995–1025
13. Bös D (1991) Privatization: a theoretical treatment. Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford
14. Boycko M, Shleifer A, Vishny R (1996) A theory of privatisation.
Econ J 106:309–319
15. Laffont JJ, Tirole J (1993) Privatization and incentives. In: Laffont
JJ, Tirole J (eds) A theory of incentives in procurement and
regulation. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 637–660
16. Sappington D, Stiglitz J (1987) Privatization, information and
incentives. J Policy Anal Manage 6:567–582
17. Schmidt K (1996) The cost and benefits of privatization. J Law
Econ Organ 12:1–24
18. Vickers J, Yarrow G (1991) Economic perspectives on privatiza-
tion. J Econ Perspect 5:111–132
19. Villalonga B (2000) Privatization and efficiency: differentiating
ownership effects from political, organizational, and dynamic
effects. J Econ Behav Organ 42:43–74
20. Shen YC, Eggleston K, Lau J et al (2007) Hospital ownership and
financial performance: what explains the different findings in the
empirical literature? Inquiry 44:41–68
21. Herr A (2008) Cost and technical efficiency of German hospitals:
does ownership matter? Health Econ 17:1057–1071
22. Tiemann O, Schreyögg J (2009) Effects of ownership on hospital
efficiency in Germany. Bus Res 2:115–145
23. Megginson WL, Nash RC, van Randenborgh M (1994) The finan-
cial and operating performance of newly privatized firms: an
international empirical analysis. J Finance 49:403–452
24. Heckman JJ, Ichimura H, Todd PE (1997) Matching as an econo-
metric evaluation estimator: evidence from evaluating a job train-
ing programme. Rev Econ Stud 64:605–654
25. Heckman JJ, Hotz VJ (1989) Choosing among alternative nonex-
perimental methods for estimating the impact of social programs:
the case of manpower training. J Am Stat Assoc 84:862–880
26. Picone G, Chou S, Sloan F (2002) Are for-profit hospital conversions
harmful to patients and to Medicare? Rand J Econ 33:507–523
27. Shen YC (2002) The effect of hospital ownership choice on patient
outcomes after treatment for acute myocardial infarction. J Health
Econ 21:901–922
28. Shen YC (2003) Changes in hospital performance after ownership
conversions. Inquiry 40:217–234
29. Farsi M (2004) Changes in hospital quality after conversion in
ownership status. Int J Health Care Finance Econ 4:211–230
30. Pestieau P (2009) Assessing the performance of the public sector.
Ann Publ Cooper Econ 80:133–161
31. Hollingsworth B (2003) Non-parametric and parametric applica-
tions measuring efficiency in health care. Health Care Manag Sci
6:203–218
32. Hollingsworth B (2008) The measurement of efficiency and
productivity of health care delivery. Health Econ 17:1107–
1128
33. Charnes A, Cooper W, Rhodes E (1978) Measuring the efficiency
of decision making units. Eur J Oper Res 2:429–444
34. Banker R, Charnes A, Cooper W (1984) Some models for esti-
mating technical and scale inefficiencies in data envelopment
analysis. Manag Sci 30:1078–1092
35. Ozcan YA (2008) Health care benchmarking and performance
evaluation: an assessment using data envelopment analysis.
Springer, New York
36. Coelli T, Rao D, Batteese G (1999) An introduction to efficiency
and productivity analysis. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston
37. Pilyavsky AI, Aaronson WE, Bernet PM et al (2006) East-west:
does it make a difference to hospital efficiencies in Ukraine?
Health Econ 15:1173–1186
38. Jacobs R, Smith PC, Street A (2006) Measuring efficiency in
health care: analytic techniques and health policy. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge
39. Syrjänen MJ (2004) Non-discretionary and discretionary factors
and scale in data envelopment analysis. Eur J Oper Res 158:20–
33
40. Burgess J, Wilson P (1998) Variation in inefficiency among US
hospitals. INFOR 36:84–102
41. Nayar P, Ozcan Y (2008) Data envelopment analysis: comparison
of hospital efficiency and quality. J Med Sys 32:193–199
42. van Walraven C, Austin P, Jennings A et al (2009) A modification
of the elixhauser comorbidity measures into a point system for
hospital death using administrative data. Med Care 47:626–633
43. Carey K (2000) A multilevel modelling approach to analysis of
patient costs under managed care. Health Econ 9:435–446
44. Carey K (2002) Hospital length of stay and cost: a multilevel
modeling analysis. Health Serv Outcome Res Meth 3:41–56
45. Dyson R, Allen R, Camanho A et al (2001) Pitfalls and protocols
in DEA. Eur J Oper Res 132:245–259
46. Blundell R, Dias MC (2000) Evaluation methods for non-
experimental data. Fisc Stud 21:427–468
47. Smith JE, Todd P (2005) Does matching overcome LaLonde’s
critique of nonexperimental estimators? J Econ 125:305–353
48. Austin PC (2008) A critical appraisal of propensity-score matching
in the medical literature between 1996 and 2003. Stat Med
27:2037–2049
49. Rosenbaum P (1989) Optimal matching for observational studies. J
Am Stat Assoc 84:1024–1032
50. Schreyögg J, Stargardt T, Tiemann O (2010) Costs and quality of
hospitals in different health care systems: a multilevel approach
with propensity score matching. Health Econ 20:85–100
51. Austin PC (2009) Some methods of propensity-score matching had
superior performance to others: results of an empirical investiga-
tion and Monte Carlo simulations. Biom J 51:171–184
52. Imai K, King G, Stuart E (2008) Misunderstandings among exper-
imentalists and observationalists about causal inference. J R Stat
Soc 171:481–502
53. Girma S, Görg H (2007) Evaluating the foreign ownership wage
premium using a difference-in-differences matching approach. J
Int Econ 72:97–112
54. Carey K, James F, Burgess JF Jr (1999) On measuring the hospital
cost/quality trade-off. Health Econ 8:509–520
55. Dudley R, Johansen K, Brand R et al (2000) Selective referral to
high-volume hospitals: estimating potentially avoidable deaths.
JAMA 283:1159–1166
56. Harrison JP, Coppola MN, Wakefield M (2004) Efficiency of
federal hospitals in the United States. J Med Syst 28:411–422
O. Tiemann, J. Schreyögg
57. Chang H, Chang WJ, Das S et al (2004) Health care regulation and
the operating efficiency of hospitals: evidence from Taiwan. J
Account Publ Pol 23:483–510
58. Rosko MD (1999) Impact of internal and external environmental
pressures on hospital inefficiency. Health Care Manag Sci 2:63–
74
59. Rosko MD (2001) Cost efficiency of US hospitals: a stochastic
frontier approach. Health Econ 10:539–551
60. Rosko MD (2004) Performance of US teaching hospitals: a panel
analysis of cost inefficiency. Health Care Manag Sci 7:7–16
61. Rosko MD, Chilingerian JA (1999) Estimating hospital inefficien-
cy: does case mix matter? J Med Syst 23:57–71
62. Garnick D, Luft H, Robinson J et al (1987) Appropriate measures
of hospital market areas. Health Serv Res 22:69–89
63. Schreyögg J, Tiemann O, Busse R (2006) Cost accounting to
determine prices: how well do prices reflect costs in the German
DRG-system? Health Care Manag Sci 9:269–279
64. Research Data Centre of the Statistical Offices of the Länder
(2009) Krankenhausstatistik (Teil I: Grunddaten, Teil II: Diagnosen
und Teil III: Kostennachweis) 1996–2008, Antrag 1133–2009
65. Sheshinski E, López-Calva L (2003) Privatization and its benefits:
theory and evidence. CESifo Econ Stud 49:429–459
66. Biørn E, Hagen TP, Iversen Tet al (2003) The effect of activity-based
financing on hospital efficiency: a panel data analysis of DEA effi-
ciency scores 1992–2000. Health Care Manag Sci 6:271–283
67. Kjerstad EM (2003) Prospective funding of general hospitals in
Norway—incentives for higher production? Int J Health Care
Finance Econ 3:231–251
68. Shleifer A (1985) A theory of yardstick competition. Rand J Econ
16:319–327
69. Newhouse JP (1970) Toward a theory of nonprofit Institutions: an
economic model of a hospital. Am Econ Rev 60:64–74
70. Weisbrod BA (1988) The nonprofit economy. Harvard University
Press, Cambridge
71. Aiken LH, Sloane DM, Lake ET et al (1999) Organization and
outcomes of inpatient AIDS care. Med Care 37:760–772
72. Aiken LH, Clarke SP, Sloane DM et al (2002) Hospital nurse
staffing and patient mortality, nurse burnout, and job dissatisfac-
tion. JAMA 288:1987–1993
73. Wörz M (2008) Erlöse—Kosten—Qualität: Macht die Krankenhaus-
trägerschaft einen Unterschied? Eine vergleichende Untersuchung
von Trägerunterschieden im akutstationären Sektor in Deutschland
und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika. VS Verlag, Wiesbaden
74. Herr A, Schmitz H, Augurzky B (2011) Profit efficiency and
ownership of German hospitals. Health Econ 20:660–674
75. Fama EF, Jensen MC (1983) Separation of ownership and control.
J Law Econ 26:301–325
76. Grossman S, Hart O (1983) An analysis of the principal-agent
problem. Econometrica 51:7–45
77. Pauly MV, Redisch MS (1973) The not-for-profit hospital as a
physician’s cooperative. Am Econ Rev 63:87–99
78. Kramer J (2007) Kommunale Krankenhäuser sind zukunftsfähig—
Ein Vergleich mit privaten Kliniken. http://www.staedtetag.de/
imperia/md/content/schwerpunkte/fachinfos/2007/19.pdf.
Accessed 24 June 2011
79. Busse R, Nimptsch U, Mansky T (2009) Measuring, monitoring,
and managing quality in Germany’s hospitals. Health Aff 28:294–
304
80. Cameron AC, Gelbach JB, Miller DL (2006) Robust Inference
with Multi-Way Clustering. NBER Technical Working Paper No.
327, University of California, Berkely.
81. Parker D, Martin S (1995) The impact of UK privatization on labor
and total factor productivity. Scot J Polit Econ 42:201–220
82. Rosenthal GE, Baker DW, Norris DG et al (2000) Relationships
between in-hospital and 30-day standardized hospital mortality:
implications for profiling hospitals. Health Serv Res 34:1449–
1468
83. Sherman HD, Zhu J (2006) Benchmarking with quality-adjusted
DEA (QDEA) to seek lower-cost high-quality service: evidence
from a US bank application. Ann Oper Res 145:301–319
84. Linna M (1998) Measuring hospital cost efficiency with panel data
models. Health Econ 7:415–427
85. Webster R, Kennedy S, Johnson L (1998) Comparing techniques
for measuring efficiency and productivity of Australian private
hospitals. Working Papers in Econometrics and Applied Statistics
No. 98/3, Australian Bureau of Statistics Catalogue, Canberra
86. Hollingsworth B, Smith P (2003) Use of ratios in data envelop-
ment analysis. Appl Econ Lett 10:733–735
Changes in hospital efficiency after privatization
